When network users are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium. In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern, the total system travel time can be worse than in the case of the PRUE. We show how bad the worst-case satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern can be, compared to the perfectly rational user equilibrium. We call the ratio between the total system travel times of the two traffic patterns the price of satisficing, for which we provide an analytical bound. We compare the analytical bound with numerical bounds for several transportation networks.
Introduction
Instead of assuming a perfectly rational person with a clear system of preferences and perfect knowledge of the surrounding decision-making environment, we can consider boundedly rational persons with (1) an ambiguous system of preferences and (2) lack of complete information, following Simon (1955) . When decision makers are indifferent among alternatives within a certain threshold, they are called satisficing decision makers, opposed to optimizing decision makers. The notion of satisficing was first introduced by Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1956 . Satisficing decision makers choose any alternative whose utility level is above a threshold, called an aspiration level, even when the alternative is not optimal. The satisficing behavior is related to the first source of boundedness-an ambiguous system of preferences.
In transportation research, modeling drivers' route choice is an important task. While the travel-time minimization has been traditionally used as a basis for such modeling, sub-optimal routechoice behavior has gained attention. Since Mahmassani and Chang (1987) , bounded rationality has gained attention in the transportation research literature (Szeto and Lo, 2006; Wu et al., 2013; Han et al., 2015; Szeto and Lo, 2006; Ge and Zhou, 2012; Di et al., 2014; Guo, 2013; Lou et al., 2010) . Empirical evidence supports bounded rationality of drivers (Nakayama et al., 2001; Zhu and Levinson, 2010) . The notion of bounded rationality has also been considered in the evaluation of value of times in connection to route-choice modeling (Xu et al., 2017) , and in the model of behavior adjustment process (Ye and Yang, 2017) . We refer readers to a review of Di and Liu (2016) . In the non-transportation literature, the notion of bounded rationality and satisficing has also received much attention (Charnes and Cooper, 1963; Lam et al., 2013; Jaillet et al., 2016; Chen et al., 1997; Brown and Sim, 2009 ).
While the above-mentioned transportation research literature considers boundedly rational drivers, their discussion is limited to satisficing drivers without considering the second source of boundedness: lack of complete information on the decision environment. Sun et al. (2018) connect the first and the second sources of boundedness by considering both satisficing behavior and incomplete information, in the context of shortest-path finding in congestion-free networks. Sun et al. (2018) study the second source by considering errors in drivers' perception of arc travel time, and conclude that their perception-error model can generally capture both sources of boundedness in rationality in a single unified modeling framework.
In the literature, the traditional network user equilibrium, Wardrop equilibrium in particular, is called the perfectly rational user equilibrium (PRUE), while a traffic pattern equilibrated among satisficing drivers is called a boundedly rational user equilibrium (BRUE). In this paper, we will use a new term satisficing user equilibrium (SatUE) instead of BRUE to emphasize that it only considers the first source of boundedness without considering drivers' incomplete information on the decision environment. We believe that the term 'BRUE' should be used to describe a broader and more general class of models, including SatUE.
Note that SatUE differs from the stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) (Sheffi, 1985) in two important aspects. First, drivers are assumed to be optimizing decision makers in SUE, while they are satisficing in SatUE. Second, with appropriate probability distributions assumed in the random utility model in SUE, each path possesses a probability of being chosen; hence we can compute the expected traffic flow rate in each path. In SatUE, however, each satisficing path is acceptable to drivers, but it may or may not be chosen by drivers and we do not know its probability of being chosen. See further discussion in Di and Liu (2016) .
The main contribution of this paper is the quantification of how bad the total system travel time in SatUE can be. In a SatUE traffic pattern, the total system travel time can be either greater than or less than that of PRUE. We define the price of satisficing (PoSat) as the ratio between the worst-case total system travel time of SatUE and the total system travel time of PRUE. This paper quantifies PoSat analytically and compares with numerical bounds.
The analytical quantification of PoSat is related to the price of anarchy (PoA) (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002) that compares the performances of the system optimal solutions and the PRUE solutions. Using a similar idea, we can also compare the performance of the perfectly rational user equilibrium traffic patterns and satisficing user equilibrium traffic patterns.
While PoA quantifies how much system-wide performance we can lose by competing, PoSat quantifies how much we can lose by satisficing. Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) define and study the PoA of approximate Nash equilibria, which are essentially SatUE patterns. We develop our bounds for PoSat based on the bounds for PoA of approximate Nash equilibria (Christodoulou et al., 2011) and the ideas from the sensitivity analysis of traffic equilibria (Dafermos and Nagurney, 1984) . Note that Perakis (2007) studies the PoA of the exact Nash equilibria with general nonlinear, asymmetric cost functions.
The notion of PoSat is also related to the price of risk aversion (Nikolova and Stier-Moses, 2015) and the deviation ratio (Kleer and Schäfer, 2016) . When network users are risk-averse decision makers, the price of risk aversion compares the performances of the resulting equilibrium among risk-averse users and the (risk-neutral) PRUE. When network users' cost functions are deviated from the true cost functions for some reasons, the deviation ratio compares the performances of the resulting equilibrium and the PRUE. Kleer and Schäfer (2016) show that the price of risk aversion is a special case of the deviation ratio. In both research articles, however, only cases with a common single origin node are considered. In this paper, we consider general cases with multiple origin nodes and multiple destination nodes, with asymmetric travel time functions. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notation and define various concepts including user equilibrium, system optimum, satisficing behavior, price of anarchy, and price of satisficing. In Section 3, we define the user equilibrium with perception errors and make connections with satisficing user equilibrium. Our main result is introduced in Section 4, where we derive the analytical worst-case bound on the price of satisficing. In Section 5, we compare the analytical bound with numerical bounds. Section 6 concludes this paper.
Notation and Definitions
Since we will use path-based and arc-based flow variables and their corresponding functions and sets interchangeably, we need clear definitions of variables, sets, and functions. We use boldfaced lower-case letters for vector quantities as in v and normal lower-case letters for their components as in v a ; similarly, vector-valued functions like t(·) and their components like t a (·). We use boldfaced upper-case letters for the set that they belong to, as in v ∈ V . We use calligraphic capital letters for sets of indices as in N . The only exception is that Q (a bold-face capital letter instead of lower case) represents a vector of Q w , the demand for OD pair w. The lower-case version q w i is instead the net amount of flow associated with OD pair w that enters or leaves node i in the next subsection
Traffic Flow Variables and Feasible Sets
We consider a network with a set of origin and destination W that is represented by directed graph G(N , A), where N is the set of nodes, and A is the set of arcs. For each OD pair w ∈ W, the travel demand is Q w and the set of available paths is P w . The set of all available paths in the whole network is defined as P = ∪ w∈W P w .
We also define the set of path flow variables f as
and the corresponding set of arc flow variables v is defined as
where δ p a = 1 if path p contains arc a and δ p a = 0 otherwise. Let A + i and A − i be the set of arcs whose tail node and head node are i, respectively. When we need to preserve OD information in arc flow variables, we use x as follows:
Therefore, the transformations from f to v, from f to x, and from x to v are unique, which are denoted by f → v, f → x, and x → v, respectively. The inverse transformations are, however, not unique. In the rest of this paper, to emphasize the non-uniqueness of the transformation and refer to any result of such transformation, we use any −→; for example, with v any −→ f , we consider any f such that v a = p∈P δ p a f p . We will use v, f , and x interchangeably to describe the same traffic pattern. In particular, we define • f * , v * , x * : system optimal flow vectors (Section 2.2)
• f 0 , v 0 , x 0 : perfectly rational user equilibrium flow vectors (Section 2.3)
• f κ , v κ , x κ : (multiplicative) satisficing user equilibrium flow vectors with a multiplicative factor (to be defined subsequently) κ (Section 2.4) Note that when κ = 0, we have f κ = f 0 .
Travel Time Functions and System Optimum
We denote arc travel function with arc traffic volume v by t a (v) for each arc a ∈ A. We consider a performance function for each arc a as
We denote the travel time function along path p with flow f by c p (f ). When written as functions of x, the arc travel time is denoted as τ a (x) or τ w a (x), where the latter is used to emphasize the focus on OD pair w. Of course, τ w a (x) = τ a (x) = t a (v), where v = w x w a . The performance function for path p ∈ P is as follows:
The following shows the relationship between path and arc travel times.
We define the arc-based total system performance function Z(v) and path-based total system performance function C(f ) interchangeably as follows:
which is also called the total system travel time. A flow pattern that minimizes Z(·) or C(·) is called a system optimal flow pattern.
for all v 1 , v 2 ∈ V . If (1) holds as a strict inequality for all v 1 = v 2 , it is said strictly monotone.
The monotonicity of path-based travel time function c p (·) or its vector form c(·) can be similarly defined. The path-based function c p (·), however, is not strongly monotone in general (e.g., see Example 3 in de Palma and Nesterov, 1998).
Perfectly Rational User Equilibrium
When network users are perfectly rational-they seek the shortest path-we attain the perfectly rational user equilibrium (PRUE) defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Perfectly Rational User Equilibrium). A traffic pattern f 0 is called a perfectly rational user equilibrium (PRUE), if
for all p ∈ P w and w ∈ W.
Using the arc travel function, the above condition can be restated as follows
It is well known that a solution to the following variational inequality problem is a user equilibrium traffic flow (Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980) :
which can be equivalently rewritten as:
or to find x ∈ X :
where τ w a (x) = τ a (x) = t a (v). With strictly monotone functions t a (·), the solution v to (6) When the travel time on arc a is a function of only v a , i.e. t a = t a (v a ), then it is called separable. With separable arc travel time functions, the variational inequality problem (6) admits an equivalent convex optimization problem as formulated by (Beckmann et al., 1956) . In general, if the Jacobian matrix of the arc travel time function vector t(v) is symmetric, that is,
for all v ∈ V , the variational inequality problem (6) can be reformulated as an equivalent Beckmanntype convex optimization problem (Patriksson, 2015; Friesz and Bernstein, 2016) . When the Jacobian is asymmetric, no Beckmann-type convex optimization problem equivalent to (6) exists in general. In this case, the arc travel time functions is characterized as asymmetric and obtaining a PRUE flow requires solving a variational inequality problem.
Satisficing User Equilibrium
We introduce definitions of satisficing behavior and corresponding user equilibrium traffic patterns.
In transportation research literature, boundedly rational user equilibrium (BRUE) is often defined with an additive term (see e.g., Lou et al., 2010; Di et al., 2013; Han et al., 2015) . Herein, we refer to BRUE in the literature as an 'additive satisficing user equilibrium' to (i) highlight its additive feature and (ii) limit user behavior to just satisficing. Bounded rationality includes behaviors other than satisficing as well.
Definition 2 (Additive Satisficing). A traffic pattern f is called an additive satisficing user equilibrium (ASatUE) with an additive factor E , if
for all p ∈ P w and w ∈ W, where E is a positive constant.
We can also derive a similar definition using a multiplicative term. While the additive form in Definition 2 is popularly used in the transportation research literature, the multiplicative form in Definition 3 enables us to consider the satisficing level in disaggregate arc levels as we will observe in this paper. Multiplicative satisficing user equilibrium is also called approximate Nash equilibrium in the price of anarchy literature (Christodoulou et al., 2011) .
Definition 3 (Multiplicative Satisficing). A traffic pattern f κ is called a multiplicative satisficing user equilibrium with a multiplicative factor κ, or κ-MSatUE, if
for all p ∈ P w and w ∈ W, where κ ≥ 0 is a constant.
Note that the additive (E) and multiplicative (κ) factor in (8) and (9), respectively, may be defined for each OD pair w. For example, E w and κ w can replace E and κ in (8) and (9), respectively, to allow for non-homogeneous satisficing thresholds. In such cases, however, we assume that travelers for the same OD pair are homogeneous with the same threshold E w or κ w . In this paper, to describe the satisficing behavior, we focus only on MSatUE. Moreover, for simplicity, we use a single value of κ for all OD pairs.
Price of Satisficing
The price of anarchy (PoA) compares the performances of a satisficing user equilibrium (C(f κ )) against that of a system optimum (C(f * )). Among possibly multiple satisficing user equilibrium traffic patterns, we are interested in the worst-case. Let Ψ κ (G, Q, t) be the set of all satisficing user equilibria with a multiplicative factor κ where G, Q, and t denote the underling network, demand vector, and travel time function, respectively. Then, the PoA for the triplet (G, Q, t) is defined as follows:
where f * is the system optimum flow for (G, Q, t). We are usually interested in its upper bound over a set of triplets, Ω., i.e.
In the context of bounded rationality and satisficing, we are more interested in comparing the performance of approximate Nash equilibrium C(f κ ) and the performance of the perfectly rational user equilibrium C(f 0 ). We define the price of satisifcing (PoSat) of instance (G, Q, t) as follows:
and its upper bound over Ω is
In this paper, Ω is a set of all triplets where G is a directed graph with a finite number of nodes and arcs, Q is a vector of finite and positive constants, and t(·) is a vector of polynomial functions with nonnegative coefficients and of order n ≥ 0. To emphasize the latter, we also write Ω(n) instead of Ω when appropriate.
User Equilibrium with Perception Errors
Related to MSatUE is the user equilibrium with perception error (UE-PE) model. In this model, we assume that network users are optimizing, i.e. seeking the shortest path; however, we assume that users may have their own perception of the travel time function.
We let ε w a denote the perception error of travel time along arc a of users in OD pair w. A vector
The above variational inequality assumes that ε is sufficiently small, i.e., 0 ≤ ε w a < t a (v) for all a ∈ A, w ∈ W. Under such an assumption, t a (v) − ε w a can be viewed as the perceived travel time for arc a for drivers of OD pair w.
The term ε w a represents the perception error for arc a and OD pair w. In this model, we assume all drivers for each OD pair are homogeneous in their perception of arc travel time.
With changes of variables λ w a t a (v) = t a (v) − ε w a , the UE-PE model (12) can be restated as follows:
for some λ such that λ w a ∈ (0, 1] for all w ∈ W and a ∈ A. We observe that the UE-PE model generates a subset of MSatUE traffic flow patterns.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given f , we let v be the arc flow vector from f → v. Let ε be the perception error that makes x a solution to (12). Then, x is a user equilibrium flow with respect to arc travel time λ w a t a (·) and the following follows from (4):
for all p ∈ P w and w ∈ W. Since λ w a ∈ [ 1 1+κ , 1], the right-hand-side of (14) implies
which is equivalent to the following path flow form:
Therefore, we conclude that f is a κ-MSatUE traffic flow.
We can also provide a path-based formulation of UE-PE:
for the perceived path travel time functions c w p (f ) = a∈A δ p a λ w a t a (v) with some λ such that λ w a ∈ (0, 1] for all a ∈ A, w ∈ W. (13), then any f with x any −→ f is a solution to UE-PE-F in (15).
Proof of Lemma 2. We can prove both directions by observing that
When the values of λ w a are the same across all w ∈ W, i.e. λ a = λ w a for all w ∈ W, we can
Figure 1: Summary of Lemmas 1-4. The relation X =⇒ Y means that any solution to X yields a solution to Y. simplify (13) as follows:
for some λ such that λ a ∈ (0, 1] for each a ∈ A. The simplified model (16) has been considered in the literature for approximate Nash equilibrium (Christodoulou et al., 2011) and Nash equilibrium with deviated travel time functions (Kleer and Schäfer, 2016) . For the simplified model, we can state:
While Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 provide sufficient conditions for a traffic flow pattern to be a κ- 
Bounding the Price of Satisficing
We first provide analytical bounds of C(f κ ) compared to C(f 0 ).
Lessons from the Price of Anarchy
We first observe that PoSat κ (G, Q, t) ≤ PoA κ (G, Q, t) for any network instance (G, Q, t), since
. This enables us to use the results from the price of anarchy literature for bounding PoSat. Theorem 2 of Christodoulou et al. (2011) bound the price of anarchy when arc travel-time functions are separable and polynomial with nonnegative coefficients and of degree n that leads immediately to the following result:
Lemma 5. Suppose f κ is a κ-MSatUE flow, and t a (·) is polynomial with nonnegative coefficients and of degree n. Define
Then we have
That is, the PoSat is bounded above by ζ(κ, n).
Proof of Lemma 5. From Theorem 2 of Christodoulou et al. (2011) , we have
Picking f = f 0 in (20), we obtain the upper bound on C(f κ ). Inequalities involving C(f * ) are
The bound in Lemma 5 is not tight when κ is small. For example, when κ = 0, C(f κ ) = C(f 0 ).
Thus, C(f κ ) C(f 0 ) = 1. On the other hand, (19) yields the following:
where the expression on the right is strictly larger than one. For example, the expression reduces to 4 3 when n = 1 and approaches infinity when n is large. In Lemma 3 of Christodoulou et al. (2011) , the existence of a network instance with C(f κ ) =
(1 + κ) n+1 C(f * ) is shown for κ ≥ (n + 1) 1/n − 1 via a circular network example presented in Figure   2 . The circular network includes m + l nodes where positive integers m and l are chosen so that m l = 1 + κ. All nodes lie in a circle and each node i is adjacent to two neighboring nodes via arc (i, i + 1) and (i − 1, i). The arc cost function for arc a is t a (v a ) = (v a ) n , where v a is the total arc flow in arc a. There are m + l OD pairs (i, i + m) for i = 1, 2, .., m + l, with unit demand from node i to node i + m (indices are taken cyclically). Note that the circular network can be easily converted to a directed network by replacing each undirected arc with two directed arcs with opposite direction. The cost associated with arc a will be t a (v a , v a ) = (v a + v a ) n in this case where v a is the flow in the arc with opposite direction.
For each OD pair (i, i + m), there are two paths, clockwise and counterclockwise. The former contains m arcs and the latter has only l. Note that our choice requires that m l = (1 + κ) where κ ≥ 0, i.e., m ≥ l. Consider the all-or-nothing strategy that sends the unit demand for every OD pair along only one path, clockwise or counterclockwise. Using the clockwise strategy, each arc has m units of flows and costs m n . Thus, the clockwise path costs m · m n , while the cost of the counterclockwise one is l · m n . Because m·m n l·m n = m l ≥ 1, the clockwise strategy is not in a user equilibrium unless m = l. For the counterclockwise strategy, each arc has l units of flows instead and costs l n . Similarly, the clockwise and counterclockwise path cost m · l n and l · l n , respectively.
Using the same reasoning as before, flow-bearing (or the counterclockwise) paths are less expensive than or the same as the unused ones. Thus, the counterclockwise strategy is in user equilibrium and yields (m + l) · l n+1 as the total travel cost. Consider MSatUE. Because it is PRUE, the counterclockwise strategy is automatically in MSatUE. But, the clockwise one is also in MSatUE because the cost of flow-bearing (or the clockwise) path is exactly (1 + κ) time the cost of the shortest path, i.e., the counterclockwise one. Additionally, the total travel cost of the clockwise strategy is (m + l) · m n+1 . Then, the PoSat of this circular network is
Thus, the bound is tight. Now consider the system problem for the circular network. The problem objective is to minimize a∈A v a t a (v). Using the counterclockwise strategy, the partial derivative of the objective function with respect to v a is (n+1)l n . Then, switching to the clockwise path would increase the total travel cost by (m − l)(n + 1)l n ≥ 0 per unit flow. Thus, the counterclockwise strategy is system optimal because switching to the unused path does not lead to a reduction in Figure 3 : The worst-case price of satisficing for n = 1 and n = 4. Note that when n = 1, the right-hand-side of (21) becomes 4(1+κ) 3−κ . For n = 1, when κ ≥ 1, we know for sure that the worstcase price of satisficing is exactly the dotted line. When κ ≤ 1, the worst case falls in the shaded interval between the solid line and dotted line. When n = 4, it is similar. cyclically):
Under the above λ, if all network users choose the clockwise path, the flow in each arc will be equal to m, the path cost for each OD pair will be 1 1+k m n+1 = lm n , which is equal to the cost of the alternative path, and thus the clockwise path is a solution to UE-PE-X and PoSat κ = (1 + κ) n+1 .
In Section 5, we will compute the PoSat numerically for these examples to confirm that UE-PE-X is a useful model to find PoSat κ . By Lemma 5, when travel time functions are polynomials of degree n with nonnegative coefficients, the PoSat is bounded as follows:
for all (G, Q, t) ∈ Ω(n) and by the circular network example in Figure 2 , we know that there indeed exists a network instance (G, Q, t) ∈ Ω(n) such that PoSat κ (G, Q, t) = (1 + κ) n+1 for all κ ≥ 0.
Therefore when κ ≥ (n + 1) 1/n − 1, the bound in (21) is tight. Figure 3a shows the bounds in (21) when travel time functions are linear or when n = 1. For smaller κ values, the worst-case PoSat falls in the shaded interval, while for larger κ values, it is exactly (1 + κ) 2 . Figure 3b shows the same bounds when n = 4 instead. When κ is zero, we have f κ = f 0 ; hence, we must have the PoSat approach to 1. With this observation, we naturally ask a question: Does (1 + κ) n+1 provide a tight bound on PoSat κ for all κ ≥ 0? We present partial answers to this question in the following sections.
Increased Travel Demands and Travel Time Functions
We first define new sets of flow vectors. When the travel demand Q w for each w ∈ W is multiplied by the factor 1 + κ, we define
The above three sets can equivalently be written as follows:
We will use 'hat' for flow vectors in these sets, for example, f κ ∈ F 1+κ , while without hat in the original sets as in f κ ∈ F .
We consider cases when the travel time functions t a (·) are polynomials of order n, in particular, the following form of asymmetric arc travel time function for each a ∈ A:
for some constants b am for m = 0, 1, ..., n and d aem for e ∈ A and m = 0, 1, ..., n. Note that we use the vector form d am = (d aem : e ∈ A). The travel time function (22) is a general form of the travel time functions considered in the traffic equilibrium literature (Meng et al., 2014; Panicucci et al., 2007) . If d am is a unit vector such that d aem is 1 if a = e and 0 otherwise, we have a separable polynomial arc travel time function that has been used in the literature popularly (Christodoulou et al., 2011; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002) :
Lemma 6. With the polynomial travel time function (22), for any f ∈ F , we have
for all κ ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. By simple comparison, we can show
where v is the arc flow vector from f → v.
Cases with Separable, Monomial Arc Travel Time Functions
As a simple case, we consider separable, monomial functions of degree n for arc travel time of the following form:
with a positive scalar b a for each a ∈ A and nonnegative constant n.
It is well known (Beckmann et al., 1956) that v 0 ∈ F is a user equilibrium flow, if and only if it minimizes the following potential function
when the arc travel time functions are separable, so that the integral is well defined. Similarly, v κ ∈ V is a κ-MSatUE flow, if it is a solution to UE-PE-V , or equivalently, if it minimizes the following potential function (Christodoulou et al., 2011) 
for some λ a ∈ [ 1 1+κ , 1] for each a ∈ A. When travel time functions are separable, we can show the following result (Englert et al., 2010; Takalloo and Kwon, 2018) :
Lemma 7. When the arc travel time functions are in the form of (23), let f 0 ∈ F and f 0 ∈ F 1+κ be the PRUE flows with the corresponding travel demands. We can show
Although Englert et al. (2010) consider cases with a single OD pair only with interest in the changes in the path travel time, the same technique can be used to prove Lemma 7 for cases with multiple OD pairs. For completeness, we include the proof to Lemma 7 in the appendix.
Using Lemma 7, we show that a solution to UE-PE-V is an MSatUE flow. Proof of Theorem 1. Since v 0 ∈ F 1+κ is an user equilibrium flow that minimizes Φ(·), we have
Since v ∈ V is a solution to UE-PE-V , we have
for some λ. Therefore, we have
Since λ a ∈ [ 1 1+κ , 1], we obtain
From A × (27) + B × (28) + C × (29) for any positive constants A, B and C, we obtain
In particular, consider A, B and C as follows:
We observe that A, B and C are all positive and θ 1 = 0. We also see that
for all κ ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0, which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we have
where the last inequality is from Lemma 7. This completes the proof.
Note that the bound obtained in Theorem 1 relies on the sufficient condition, not a necessary condition. Therefore, the result is not applicable to all MSatUE flows, although it provides a useful bound in the framework of UE-PE models.
Cases with Separable Arc Travel Time Functions
We consider general polynomial, separable arc travel functions in the form of (23).
Theorem 2. Suppose that the arc travel time functions are in the form of (23). Let f κ ∈ F be any κ-MSatUE and f 0 ∈ F 1+κ be the PRUE flow. Suppose that κ ≥ 0 is sufficiently small, in particular, so that
Proof of Theorem 2. By slightly modifying the proof of Theorem 3, we can show C(f κ ) ≤ C( f 0 ).
By Lemmas 6 and 7, we complete the proof.
Theorem 2 depends on condition (31) and a similar condition appears in general asymmetric cases as in Theorem 3. We discuss this condition in Section 4.6.
General Cases with Asymmetric Arc Travel Time Functions
We consider asymmetric arc travel time functions (22), in which case Lemma 7 is not applicable.
We first observe that the multiple of a PRUE flow, (1 + κ)f 0 , provides a satisficing solution to the traffic equilibrium problem with the increased travel demand.
Lemma 8. Suppose t a (·) are polynomials of order n as defined (22). If f 0 ∈ F is a PRUE flow, then (1 + κ)f 0 is a σ-MSatUE flow with σ = (1 + κ) n − 1 in F 1+κ . When n = 1, we have σ = κ.
Proof. Let f = (1 + κ)f 0 , and v = (1 + κ)v 0 for the corresponding arc flow vectors. If the condition a∈A n m=0
holds for some constants λ am ∈ [ 1 1+σ , 1] for m = 0, 1, ..., n and a ∈ A, then we can find λ a ∈ [ 1 1+σ , 1] such that Since v 0 is PRUE for V , we know that
Therefore a∈A n m=0
Letting for all a ∈ A
we observe that λ am ∈ [ 1 1+σ , 1] and we obtain (32); hence proof.
By introducing an additional condition, we compare MSatUE flows with the proportional travel demand increase, and obtain the worst-case bound of PoSat.
Theorem 3. Let f κ ∈ F be any κ-MSatUE and f σ ∈ F 1+κ be any σ-MSatUE flows with the corresponding travel demands, when σ = (1 + κ) n − 1. Suppose that κ ≥ 0 is sufficiently small, in particular, so that that
among all κ-MSatUE flows in F and
among all κ-MSatUE flows in F 1+κ . Comparing the two quantities, we observe C(f κ ) ≤ C( f 0 ) in both cases. To prove Theorem 3, condition (31) needs to hold only for these two flow vectors.
Regardless of the value of κ, however, it is impossible to satisfy condition (31), although the worstcase PoSat bound (1 + κ) n+1 still holds for all κ ≥ 0. The price of satisficing is 1 + κ 2 Q if κ < Q and 1 + Q if κ ≥ Q in this example, both of which are less than (1 + κ) 2 .
On the other hand, in Example 2, we have strictly monotone travel time functions in both arcs.
Similarly, we consider
(1 + κ)Q 2 and can verify that C(f κ ) ≤ C( f 0 ) for all κ ≥ 0. In Example 2, we note that (33) holds for κ ≤ 0.206. In this example, we observe that the price of satisficing is 2(2+2κ+κ 2 ) (2+κ) 2 , which is no greater than (1 + κ) 2 for all κ ≥ 0.
Other Approaches
When there is a single origin and multiple destinations, i.e., a single common origin node, in the network, Kleer and Schäfer (2016) introduces the notion of the deviation ratio that compares the system performances of the user equilibrium and the equilibrium with deviated travel time functions t a (·). The notion of deviation may also be interpreted as perception in our definition. In a special case, the deviation ratio is reduced to the price of risk aversion (Nikolova and Stier-Moses, 2015) that compares the performances of equilibria among risk-averse and risk-neutral network users. Kleer and Schäfer (2016) define the (separable) deviated travel time functions with the following bounds:
where −1 ≤ α ≤ 0 ≤ β. The consideration of this deviated travel time function generalizes our UE-PE model where α = − κ 1+κ and β = 0. Kleer and Schäfer (2016) show that the worst-case deviation ratio with (34) is bounded by
Therefore, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4 (Kleer and Schäfer, 2016) . Consider a directed graph with a single common origin node with the total travel demand Q and let |N | be the number of nodes. Then we have
where v κ is a solution to UE-PE-V in (16).
Note that Theorem 4 only covers a subset of the entire MSatUE flows, as it is limited to the solutions UE-PE-V in (16) and is applicable to cases with a single common origin. When Theorem 4 is applied in the examples in Figure 4 , the bound (35) becomes 1 + κQ.
Numerical Bounds
To quantify PoSat in typical traffic networks and compare it with the analytical bound obtained in Theorem 3, we define the worst-case problem for the total system travel time under MSatUE as follows:
subject to v κ is an MSatUE flow with κ
To quantify the benefit of satisficing, instead of maximizing, we can minimize the objective function (36). Since MSatUE involves path-based definition and formulation, (36) is numerically more challenging to solve. Instead, we replace MSatUE by UE-PE-X. We know that the UE-PE-X.
models provide a subset of MSatUE traffic flow patterns as seen in Lemmma 1; hence by using UE-PE-X models, we will obtain suboptimal solutions to (36).
Using UE-PE-X in (12), we formulate the worst-case problem as follows:
subject to a∈A w∈W
Problem (37) is an instance of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We can replace the equilibrium condition (38) by the following KKT conditions to create a single-level optimization problem:
The resulting problem is a mathematical program with complementarity conditions (MPCC), which is nonlinear and nonconvex. Finding a global solution to MPCC problems is in general difficult, and Kleer and Schäfer (2016) has shown that solving the above MPCC optimally is NP-hard. In order to solve this problem, we use an interior point method by utilizing the Ipopt nonlinear solver (Wächter and Biegler, 2006) with multiple starting solutions.
Numerical Experiments
In this section we present some examples to compare the total travel times in MSatUE and PRUE numerically for both separable and asymmetric networks. We approximate MSatUE by UE-PE-X and solve it by the Ipopt nonlinear solver, after reformulating (36) as a single-level optimization problem using KKT conditions. We use the Julia Language and the JuMP package (Dunning et al., 2017) for modeling and interfacing with the Ipopt solver.
Simple Networks
To test the validity and the strength of UE-PE-X model, we first consider Examples 1 and 2 in 
Larger Networks
We Figure 7 : PoSat for nine-node network point method (Dafermos, 1980) with a randomized λ to obtain an initial solution x. We randomly generate five initial starting points for each example and report the largest PoSat values.
We first consider the nine-node network presented in Hearn and Ramana (1998) . The nine-node network consists of 9 nodes and 18 arcs, and the travel time functions are polynomials of order n = 4. We also create an asymmetric variant of the nine-node network as shown in Figure 9 in Appendix B. The asymmetric nine-node network has non-separable arc cost function in the form of (49). The comparison result is presented in Figure 7a . As Figure 7a represents PoSat κ increases with κ for both symmetric and asymmetric nine-node network since PRUE total travel time is fixed with respect to κ, while the worst-case MSatUE total travel time increases as κ increases. Moreover, PoSat κ is smaller for symmetric nine-node network compared to the asymmetric nine-node network for smaller κ values (0.1 and 0.2), but it is greater for larger κ values (κ ≥ 0.3). In general, the gap between PoSat κ for symmetric nine-node network and asymmetric nine-node network is small. Figure 7b compares the numerical PoSat κ with the analytical bound provided in Theorem 2 for
MSatUE for the nine-node network. We observe that there is a large gap between the analytical and numerical bounds which increases with κ. Although the analytical result certainly provides a valid bound, it is too large to be practically useful in realistic road networks. This indicates opportunities for empirical studies on the analytical bounds that depend on more network-specific information such as travel demands and travel time functions. The bound (1 + κ) n+1 in Theorem 2 is independent from such network-specific information.
We also consider the Sioux Falls network presented in Suwansirikul et al. (1987) , which consists of 24 nodes, 76 arcs, and 576 OD pairs. The arc travel cost function is the BPR function, which is a polynomial function with degree n = 4. We also consider an asymmetric variant of Sioux Falls network with arc cost function in the form of (49). As Figure 8a represents, PoSat κ increases with κ for both symmetric and asymmetric Sioux Falls network, and it is greater compared to the ninenode network for both symmetric and asymmetric networks. Furthermore, PoSat κ is greater for Sioux Falls network increases with κ. Figure 8b compares the numerical PoSat κ with the analytical bound. The gap between the analytical and the numerical bound is tighter compared to the ninenode network, but it is still considerable.
Concluding Remarks
When network users are satisficing decision makers, the resulting satisficing user equilibria may degrade the system performance, compared to the perfectly rational user equilibrium. To quantify how much the performance can deteriorate, this paper has quantified the worst-case analytical bound on the price of satisficing. We also quantified the price of satisficing for several networks numerically and compare it to the analytical bound.
As we have seen in the numerical examples in this paper, there is a large gap between the worst-case analytical bound and the actual bound. Clearly, this is a limitation of our approach. In the literature of the price of anarchy have similar observations been reported (O'Hare et al., 2016; Monnot et al., 2017; Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2017) . Likewise, the behavior of the price of satisficing in practice can be quite different from what we have observed in this paper. Deriving empirical or network-specific bounds can be meaningful contributions as a future research direction.
We suggest additional potential future research directions. For the proposed analytical bound, our result is based on the condition (33). By attempting to relax this condition, one may obtain a global bound for any value of κ. In deriving the analytical bound, we utilized a novel technique comparing equilibrium patterns before and after the travel demand is increased; namely V and V 1+κ . Applying this technique in the context of the price of risk aversion and the deviation ratio would be an interesting research direction. (1 + κ) n+1 a∈A b a n + 1 (v 0 a ) n+1 ≤ a∈A b a n + 1
and a∈A b a n + 1
respectively.
Let us assume that C( f 0 ) > (1 + κ) n+1 C(f 0 ), which is equivalent to
From n × (45) + ((n + 1)(1 + κ) n − 1) × (46) + ((1 + κ) n − 1) × (47), we obtain where θ 1 = n · (1 + κ) n+1 n + 1 − ((n + 1)(1 + κ) n − 1) · (1 + κ) n+1 n + 1 + ((1 + κ) n − 1) · (1 + κ) n+1 = 0 θ 2 = n · 1 n + 1 − ((n + 1)(1 + κ) n − 1) · 1 n + 1 + ((1 + κ) n − 1) = 0 for all κ ≥ 0. Therefore, (48) leads to 0 < 0, which is a contradiction. We conclude that C( f 0 ) ≤
(1 + κ) n+1 C(f 0 ).
B Nine-node Asymmetric Networks
In order to test the performance of UE-PE-X model in an asymmetric network, we create an asymmetric version of the nine-node network considered by Hearn and Ramana (1998) . In the asymmetric nine-node network, which has been shown in Figure 9 , we add a few additional arcs and assume that the arc travel cost function is:
where a is the flow in the opposite arc. Thus, the arc travel function depends not only on the flow in that arc, but also on the flow in the arc in opposite direction. The values of parameters A a , B a and C a are given in Table 1 for each arc. (1,5) 12 1.80 5 (1,6) 18 2.70 6 (2,5) 35 5.25 3 (2,6) 35 5.25 9 (5,6) 20 3.00 9 (5,7) 11 1.65 2 (5,9) 26 3.90 8 (6,8) 33 4.95 6 (6,9) 30 4.50 8 (7,3) 25 3.75 3 (7,4) 24 3.60 6 (7,8) 19 2.85 2 (8,3) 39 5.85 8 (8,4) 43 6.45 6 (9,7) 26 3.90 4 (9,8) 30 4.50 8 (5,1) 12 1.80 5 (6,1) 18 2.70 6 (5,2) 35 5.25 3 (6,2) 35 5.25 9 (6,5) 20 3.00 9 (7,5) 11 1.65 2 (9,5) 26 3.90 8 (8,6) 33 4.95 6 (9,6) 30 4.50 8 (3,7) 25 3.75 3 (4,7) 24 3.60 6 (8,7) 19 2.85 2 (3,8) 39 5.85 8 (4,8) 43 6.45 6 (7,9) 26 3.90 4 (8,9) 30 4.50 8
